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James R. May*
It is an honor to write the introduction for this special issue of the
law review. Every now and again there is a case that subjects the U.S.
Supreme Court to a kind of stress-test. A case that reveals the Court’s
willingness to engage in tough social issues, or instead kick the can to
coordinate branches of government, or to the states. On occasion, an
environmental case will push the Court mightily over constitutional
issues of standing, political question doctrine, separation of powers, and
federalism.
The recently decided American Electric Power Co. v.
Connecticut (“AEP”) is just such a case.1
This issue of the law review takes a hard look at the implications of
AEP. It features one of the amicus briefs filed in the case, and offers three
divergent commentaries. In Law Professors’ Brief on Behalf of Respondents,
Stuart Banner and I argue that the Court has never held, or even
suggested, that constitutional doctrine forecloses judicial review of
common law claims like the one in this case.2 And even if the political
question doctrine limited judicial consideration of common law claims,
we conclude that the public nuisance claims in AEP are not nonJames R. May is Professor of Law and Graduate Engineering (adjunct) at Widener
University where he teaches constitutional and environmental law and co-directs the
Environmental Law Center. He was Counsel of Record for the Brief of Law Professors on
Behalf of Respondents in AEP v. Connecticut. He wrote this essay in conjunction with
remarks delivered to Valparaiso University School of Law’s 25th Annual Monsanto
Symposium, entitled Civil Litigation as a Tool for Regulating Climate Change on February 18,
2011. He may be reached at: jrmay@widener.edu.
1
Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011). For a summary of the
decision, see James May, Supreme Court Decides that Clean Air Act Displaces Federal Common
Law Claims for Climate Change, TRENDS (ABA), Sept.–Oct. 2011 [hereinafter May, Supreme
Court Decides].
2
See also James R. May, Climate Change, Constitutional Consignment, and the Political
Question Doctrine, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 919 (2008) (arguing that common law claims
respecting GHGs are justiciable).
*
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justiciable political questions. In Litigation’s Role in the Path of U.S. Federal
Climate Change Regulation: Implications of AEP v. Connecticut, Hari M.
Osofsky explores the significance of AEP for U.S. federal legal
approaches to regulating climate change. Professor Osofsky concludes
that AEP leaves most greenhouse gas (“GHG”) cases unaffected.3 In
Does the Judiciary Have the Tools for Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions?,
Victor E. Schwartz, Phil Goldberg, and Christopher E. Appel answer the
question in the negative. They conclude that regulation of GHG
emissions is best left to the elected federal branches.4 In On Thin Air:
Standing, Climate Change and the National Environmental Policy Act, Kevin
Haroff concludes that causes of action concerning GHGs rooted in
federal statutory laws other than the Clean Air Act (“CAA”), e.g., the
National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), are unlikely to reduce
GHG emissions.5
This Essay contains a summary of AEP and discusses its
implications. It concludes that AEP has had a profound impact on GHG
litigation and policymaking. It will be the case of threshold reference on
issues of displacement, constitutional and prudential standing, the
political question doctrine, and the role of common and statutory law in
addressing GHG emissions.
I. OVERVIEW OF AEP
In AEP, a combination of states, the City of New York, and several
land trust organizations sued the nation’s five largest fossil-fuel-burning
electric utility companies to force them to reduce their GHG emissions.
The plaintiffs argued that GHG emissions from the utilities contributed
to a public nuisance under the federal common law. The Supreme Court
ultimately rejected this claim, reasoning that the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (“EPA”) had taken sufficient action as authorized by
the CAA to regulate GHG emissions so as to displace associated federal
common law nuisance causes of action for injunctive action.
The issues in AEP developed in a peculiar way. The plaintiffs asked
the court for injunctive relief to “cap” defendants’ emissions, develop a
schedule for reducing defendants’ emissions on a percentage basis over
time, assess and measure available alternative energy resources, and

Hari M. Osofsky, Litigation’s Role in the Path of U.S. Federal Climate Change Regulation:
Implications of AEP v. Connecticut, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 447, 453–54 (2012).
4
Victor E. Schwartz, Phil Goldberg & Christopher E. Appel, Does the Judiciary Have the
Tools for Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions?, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 369, 371 (2012).
5
Kevin T. Haroff, On Thin Air—Standing, Climate Change, and the National Environmental
Policy Act, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 411, 446 (2012).
3
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reconcile its relief with U.S. foreign and domestic policy. The utility
defendants argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing.
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
dismissed the case on a ground that the defendants had not originally
briefed: the political question doctrine.6 The doctrine holds that federal
courts should not consider certain matters consigned to the
representative branches. The court concluded that it was impossible for
it to make the “initial policy determination . . . that must be made by the
elected branches before a non-elected court can properly adjudicate a
It concluded that plaintiffs’
global warming nuisance claim.”7
allegations
were
“extraordinary,”
“patently
political,”
and
“transcendently legislative.”8 Thus, the district court ruled that the
doctrine applied to divest federal courts from hearing the plaintiffs’
federal common law claims.
The case idled on appeal at the Second Circuit for more than four
years. In 2009, a two judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals—that had
originally included Judge and now Supreme Court Associate Justice
Sotomayor—for the Second Circuit reversed, finding climate claims in
tort law to be justiciable.9 The court held that no aspect of the political
question doctrine applied to enjoin judicial review. In particular, the
circuit court found that climate change is neither constitutionally
consigned to the elected branches, nor prudentially left to them.
The U.S. Supreme Court then granted American Electric Power and
the other utility defendants’ petition for certiorari on three issues,
whether: (1) the states and other plaintiffs lacked standing; (2) federal
law displaced plaintiffs’ claims; and (3) the case raised nonjusticiable
political questions. Justice Sotomayor recused herself from the case,
leaving it before the eight remaining justices.
The Obama administration filed a brief on behalf of defendant
Tennessee Valley Authority—on the same side as the utility
defendants—arguing that plaintiffs lack prudential standing and federal
law displaces the need for common law causes of action for climate
change. In particular, the solicitor general argued that various EPA
activities displace the need for federal common law causes of action.
Oral argument harbored a few surprises. None of the justices
seriously questioned that climate change is occurring, that human
activity is playing a role in that dynamic, that the CAA bestows upon
EPA the authority to regulate GHGs as a “pollutant” under Massachusetts
6
7
8
9

Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
Id. at 272–73.
Id. at 271 n.6, 272.
Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 393 (2d Cir. 2009).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 46, No. 2 [2012], Art. 1

360

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

v. EPA, that at least the states possess both constitutional and prudential
standing, or that federal courts have authority to consider cases
concerning climate change.
Yet the Court was clearly uncomfortable with elevating the
judgment of a district judge about GHGs over that of other coordinate
branches.
[S]everal Justices expressed skepticism about the
propriety of using federal common law in this context,
including the more “liberal” wing of the [C]ourt—
Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Elena
Kagan. For example, Justice Breyer asked, “if the courts
can set emission standards, why can’t they also set
carbon taxes, which are likely to be more effective?
What's the end of it?” Justice Kagan inquired, “this
sounds like the paradigmatic thing that administrative
agencies do rather than courts.” Justice Ginsburg
remarked to the respondents’ attorney: “Congress set
up the EPA to promulgate standards for emissions,
and . . . the relief you’re seeking seems to me to set up a
district judge, who does not have the resources, the
expertise, as a kind of super EPA.”10
Many in attendance (including me) saw the writing on the wall, an 8-0
finish, details to be announced.
Sure enough, the Court reversed the Second Circuit 8-0 (Justice
Sotomayor, recused), deciding that federal public law displaces the
federal common law before it. In so doing, the Court hardly engaged
two-thirds of the issues before it. Moreover, four Justices, including
Justice Kennedy, accepted without analysis that the states possess
constitutional standing under Massachusetts v. EPA. 11 This suggests that
five members of the Court, including Justice Sotomayor, still accept that
position. None of the justices seriously questioned that climate change is
occurring and that human activity is playing a role in that dynamic,12 or
that the CAA bestows upon EPA the authority to regulate GHGs as a

May, Supreme Court Decides, supra note 1, at 1, 15.
549 U.S. 497 (2007).
12
One curious aspect of the decision is that notwithstanding the extent to which the
Court seemed to rely on Massachusetts v. EPA, Justice Ginsburg noted: “The Court, we
caution, endorses no particular view of the complicated issues related to carbon dioxide
emissions and climate change.” Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2533
n.2 (2011).
10
11
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“pollutant” under the CAA.13 None of the justices saw fit to discuss
either the political question or prudential standing arguments. This
could suggest that eight justices do not believe that these issues are
salient in the climate context under federal common law.
Instead, the Court honed in on the displacement issue. Justice
Ginsburg’s reluctance to convert district courts into “super” EPAs
proved a harbinger. Writing for an 8-0 majority of the Court, Justice
Ginsburg held that the authority that the CAA grants to the EPA to
regulate GHGs, when coupled with what EPA had done, displaces
federal common law in the matter. In light of developments in the first
branch, the Court was simply unwilling to vest federal judges with the
task of performing what it viewed to be primarily regulatory roles
subject to democratic processes:
The judgments the plaintiffs would commit to federal
judges, in suits that could be filed in any federal district,
cannot be reconciled with the decision making scheme
Congress enacted. The Second Circuit erred, we hold, in
ruling that federal judges may set limits on [GHG]
emissions in face of a law empowering EPA to set the
same limits, subject to judicial review only to ensure
against action “arbitrary, capricious, . . . or otherwise not
in accordance with law.”14
Indeed, the regulatory goalposts have shifted significantly since the
initial case was filed in 2004. Since then, EPA has, among other climate
regulatory activities: determined that GHGs “endanger” public health
and welfare and are thus a “pollutant” subject to regulation under the
CAA; issued rules requiring utilities and others to report their GHG
emissions; said that new or modified major sources of GHGs may be
subject to new source review; and said that other new sources may be
subject to new source performance standards for GHG emissions.
The Court’s ruling in Massachusetts v. EPA that the CAA provides
EPA with discretionary authority to regulate GHGs as “air pollutants”
loomed large:

13
Notably, however, Justice Alito (joined by Justice Thomas) issued a brief concurrence
that seems to question Massachusetts v. EPA. As Justice Alito wrote in somewhat stilted
prose, “I agree with the Court’s displacement analysis on the assumption (which I make for
the sake of argument because no party contends otherwise) that the interpretation of the
[CAA] adopted by the majority in Massachusetts v. EPA, is correct.” Id. at 2540–41 (Alito, J.,
with whom Thomas, J., joins, concurring) (citation omitted).
14
Id. at 2540 (second alteration in original).
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We hold that the [CAA] and the EPA actions it
authorizes displace any federal common law right to
seek abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions from fossilfuel fired power plants. Massachusetts made plain that
emissions of carbon dioxide qualify as air pollution
subject to regulation under the Act. And we think it
equally plain that the Act “speaks directly” to emissions
of carbon dioxide from the defendants’ plants.15
Moreover, the Court was unconvinced that federal courts in
common law nuisance suits should play a role in competing with EPA’s
regulatory authority:
It is altogether fitting that Congress designated an expert
agency, here, EPA, as best suited to serve as primary
regulator of [GHG] emissions. The expert agency is
surely better equipped to do the job than individual
district judges issuing ad hoc, case-by-case injunctions.
Federal judges lack the scientific, economic, and
technological resources an agency can utilize in coping
with issues of this order.16
In sum, the Court held that the federal common law claims for
injunctive relief are displaced because they are already within EPA’s
regulatory grasp under the CAA.
II. DISCUSSION
So where does this leave common law and the regulation of GHGs?
Professor Osofsky concludes in this issue that AEP leaves most causes of
action to address GHG emissions intact.17 She observes that AEP “leaves
alone most pending litigation except for the limited set of cases claiming
federal common law nuisance, and even then it indicates that its ruling
Schwartz,
depends on the current context of EPA authority.”18
Goldberg, and Appel, however, disagree, concluding here:
that federal and state judiciaries, given their institutional
constraints, do not have the capabilities to establish
GHG emission limits in an effective, consistent, and
15
16
17
18

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol46/iss2/1

Id. at 2537 (citations omitted).
Id. at 2539–40.
See Osofsky, supra note 3, at 454–55.
Id. at 455.
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nondiscriminatory manner. It also shows that the
Supreme Court, in [AEP], provided a blueprint and
broad mandate for state and federal courts to reject any
claim that would regulate GHG emissions.19
The kind of cases that AEP leaves open is most likely limited to
public nuisance under state common law, public nuisance under federal
common law for damages, and an ever increasing canon of cases under
federal environmental statutes, including the NEPA. First, the Court
explained that its ruling does not affect state common law causes of
action: “None of the parties have briefed preemption or otherwise
addressed the availability of a claim under state nuisance law. We
therefore leave the matter open for consideration on remand.”20 The
Court noted that any such action would warrant examination under the
Supremacy Clause: “In light of our holding that the [CAA] displaces
federal common law, the availability vel non of a state lawsuit depends,
inter alia, on the preemptive effect of the Federal [CCA].”21
Second, AEP did not address federal common law causes of action
for damages. Chief among these cases is Native Village of Kivalina v.
ExxonMobil Corp., an action against the oil and gas industry under
federal common law for $440 million in damages. The district court
dismissed that action as a nonjusticiable political question, holding that
“neither [p]laintiffs nor AEP offers any guidance as to precisely what
judicially discoverable and manageable standards are to be employed in
resolving the claims at issue. . . . [Furthermore,] cases do not provide
guidance that would enable the Court to reach a resolution of this case in
any ‘reasoned’ manner.”22 Native Village of Kivalina is currently before
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.23
Third, AEP does not rule out federal common law actions for public
nuisance for injunctive relief entirely if EPA either loses or does not
exercise its regulatory authority over GHGs. The 112th Congress and
several presidential candidates have made blocking EPA action on
climate change a priority, after all. Suspending or terminating EPA’s
authority to regulate GHGs could stretch the displacement defense to the
breaking point. Yet as Professor Osofsky observes here, regulatory suits
“provide limited opportunities for victims to obtain redress.”24
Schwartz, et al., supra note 4, at 371.
Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2540.
21
Id.
22
Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 876 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
23
Appellant’s Opening Brief, Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobile Corp, No. 0917490 (filed Mar. 10, 2010).
24
See Osofsky, supra note 3, at 456.
19
20
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Any examination of federal common law would likely warrant
reanimation of the political question doctrine. The Supreme Court has
noted that there are certain “formulations” of cases that raise so-called
“political questions.” These include matters that are demonstrably
committed to a coordinate branch of government, require an initial
policy determination, lack ascertainable standards, or could otherwise
result in judicial embarrassment—such matters are nonjusticiable.25 For
example, the Court has recognized executive power over foreign affairs,
impeachment, and treaty abrogation as political questions into which
courts ought to decline jurisdiction, finding them to be consigned to the
elected federal branches of government under the “political question
doctrine.”26
That none of the justices engaged the political question doctrine head
on could suggest a number of things. At least eight justices do not
believe that the political question doctrine is a salient issue in the climate
context under federal common law. Indeed, the Court seemed to suggest
that the doctrine did not call into question Massachusetts v. EPA:
We hold that the [CAA] and the EPA actions it
authorizes displace any federal common law right to
seek abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions from fossilfuel fired power plants. Massachusetts made plain that
emissions of carbon dioxide qualify as air pollution
subject to regulation under the Act. And we think it
equally plain that the Act “speaks directly” to emissions
of carbon dioxide from the defendants’ plants.27
On the other hand, the Court’s reasoning in finding plaintiffs’ federal
common law claims to be displaced might apply with congruent force to
the political question doctrine. But whether and how the political
question doctrine applies in cases involving federal common law and
climate remains to be seen.
All eight participating justices were skeptical about the propriety of
using federal common law in this context: “The judgments the plaintiffs
would commit to federal judges, in suits that could be filed in any
federal district, cannot be reconciled with the decisionmaking scheme

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962); see, James R. May, Climate Change, Constitutional
Consignment, and the Political Question Doctrine, supra note 2, at 958.
26
See generally James R. May, The Political Question Doctrine in Environmental Law, in
PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 217, 220 (James R. May ed., 2011).
Climate change litigation has now entered this mix.
27
Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2011) (citations omitted).
25
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Congress enacted.”28 Yet the Court has never applied the doctrine to
foreclose review of common law claims.
In fact, as Stuart Banner and I maintain in our brief, under the
political question doctrine, certain constitutional issues are reserved to the
political branches for decision. The doctrine has no application to
common law claims like the one in AEP. The Court should reject
invitations to extend the doctrine far beyond its traditional limits.
In every case in which the Court has found federal jurisdiction
lacking because of the political question doctrine, the plaintiff’s claim has
been founded on the Constitution. Meanwhile, the Court has addressed
a great many common law issues over the years, without ever
suggesting, much less holding, that any of them might be political
questions. This sharp distinction is not a mere matter of labeling. It is a
fundamental divide necessitated by the very nature of the political
question doctrine, which is rooted in the Constitution’s separation of
powers. The six formulations established in Baker v. Carr,29 are tools for
dividing constitutional claims between the competence of the courts and
the political branches. They have never had any bearing on common law
claims, which are always within the competence of courts.
Whenever a constitutional issue that is non-justiciable under the
political question doctrine has arisen within a lawsuit under the common
law, the Court has deferred to the political branches’ resolution of the
constitutional issue, but has nevertheless always retained jurisdiction
over the common law case and decided it on the merits. In such cases,
the Court has never decided that the common law claim itself is nonjusticiable.
To be sure, there is no reason to accept petitioners’ invitation to
expand the political question doctrine far beyond its traditional confines.
A legal issue is not converted into a political question simply because
one might have policy grounds for preferring that it be resolved by
another branch of government. Even if this nuisance suit will be as novel
and complex as petitioners allege, their concerns can be addressed the
way such concerns have always been addressed, through the courts’
interpretation of the common law of nuisance.
And even if the political question doctrine applied to nonconstitutional issues, this nuisance claim would not be a political
question. None of the six Baker formulations is inextricable from this
case. The authority to resolve common law nuisance claims is neither
textually nor implicitly committed to either Congress or the President.

28
29

Id. at 2540.
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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Nuisance claims are not textually committed to the political
branches. The Constitution does not commit to the political branches the
exclusive power to resolve nuisance claims, to adjudicate environmental
disputes, or to address the question of climate change. If there is any
constitutional text authorizing one of the branches to decide this case, it
is Article III, which explicitly provides that “[t]he judicial Power shall
extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity . . . .”30
Nuisance claims are governed by judicially discoverable and
manageable standards. Petitioners argue that because the law of
nuisance incorporates a broad reasonableness standard rather than a set
of precise rules, there will be no “right” or “wrong” answers in this case.
But that is an argument that would make political questions out of all
nuisance cases, not just this one. Indeed, all of the Court’s prior nuisance
cases were governed by the very same standards that petitioners claim
are undiscoverable in this case.
An issue does not become non-justiciable merely because it is
governed by a broad standard like reasonableness. An issue is nonjusticiable when it is governed by no standard at all. When the
applicable standard is merely broadly worded or incapable of being
reduced to bright line rules, the Court has consistently refused to hold
that an issue is a political question.
Nuisance claims can be decided without an initial policy
determination of the kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion. This Baker
formulation prevents courts from making only those policy
determinations that are clearly within the exclusive power of the
executive branch, involving matters like which nation has sovereignty
over disputed territory, and it proscribes only decisions explicitly setting
forth the policy of the United States on a particular matter. It does not
bar courts from making the implicit policy judgments they traditionally
make in common law cases.
None of the remaining Baker formulations is inextricable from a
common law case respecting GHGs. A court applying the common law
would not express any lack of the respect due to the political branches.
The common law of nuisance cannot override any decisions already
made by the political branches. And there is no possibility of
inconsistent pronouncements by the judiciary and another branch,
because the other branches can always displace the common law of
nuisance.
Last, AEP does not affect efforts to invoke federal statutory laws to
address GHG emissions, such as NEPA. Kevin Haroff concludes in these

30
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pages, however, that such actions will not reduce actual emissions of
GHGs:
Nevertheless, courts should be careful to recognize that
using NEPA as a litigation strategy may have limited
value as a weapon in any war on global warming. After
more than a quarter century of judicial development, the
rules governing standing under NEPA and other federal
environmental laws are well established, and they
necessarily focus on relatively localized impacts from
domestic projects, which have a substantial federal
connection with the United States. Those rules are not
intended to apply to highly-generalized impacts
associated with a global phenomenon like climate
change, caused by activities diffusely spread across the
planet. In the case of agency actions, like those
considered in Watson, a requirement to prepare detailed
environmental impact studies under NEPA will not
reduce global warming in any appreciable way.31
This, combined with the shortcomings in common and existing
statutory law and international treaties, seems to invite the question of
just how legally to address GHG emissions, short of a new, specially
crafted piece of legislation to do so, something akin to a “Greenhouse
Gas Act.”
III. CONCLUSION
AEP is an important decision in the field of environmental law. It
stands astride several junctures: public and private law; environmental,
constitutional, and international law; injunctive and legal relief; state and
federal action; and judicially, legislatively, and administratively
fashioned responses. With its cornucopian issues extraordinaire—
separation of powers, federalism, standing, displacement, political
question, tort, and prudence—it has something for nearly all legal tastes,
temperaments, and talents. AEP will continue to have profound and
uncertain impacts on GHG related litigation and regulation, especially
concerning jurisprudential notions of displacement, constitutional and
prudential standing, the political question doctrine, and the role of
common and statutory law.

31

Haroff, supra note 5, at 446.
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